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Abstract 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) represents a compelling example of international governance 
via formal organizations, since it imposes new and potentially costly obligations on states. 
International Relations has long been concerned with how institutions affect actor behaviour, yet 
despite this pedigree, the impact of the ICC has only begun to be systematically explored. This 
Working Paper contributes to the growing literature on the Court’s efficacy by examining the diffusion 
of ICC norms in the international system. To do so it presents a new dataset measuring the 
incorporation of core ICC standards in domestic law. Overall, the evidence suggests only limited 
adoption of the relevant standards, and consequently important gaps exist in the contemporary grave 
crimes regime. Moreover, the patterns of state incorporation support tentative hypotheses concerning 
the adoption of international norms, suggesting that we should be able to anticipate key challenges and 
opportunities in future efforts to internalize international legal standards. 
Keywords 
The International Criminal Court, international norms, the international system, domestic law, state 
incorporation. 
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Introduction 
How do international organizations (IOs) influence state practice? This subject occupies a central 
place in the International Relations literature, with a variety of theoretical and methodological 
perspectives examining the roles that IOs may play as delegates enacting state demands, or as 
autonomous policymaking actors in their own right. Often this influence is manifest through the 
dissemination of new roles, standards and norms that in turn inform how actors (including states, 
armed groups, civil society and corporations) frame their policy choices. A central concern, therefore, 
has been whether, how and under what conditions organizations—including multilateral legal 
institutions—can shape the conduct of global politics by changing what actors want, and how they 
pursue their interests.  
The International Criminal Court (ICC) represents a particularly compelling example of 
international governance via formal organizations. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court establishes a new institution that consolidates international practices concerning the appropriate 
means of punishing grave violations of international humanitarian and criminal law. In this regard it 
acts both as an independent legal enforcement mechanism and as a standard-setting body, by 
articulating the content of the contemporary anti-atrocity regime. In so doing, the Court also holds 
substantial implications for state sovereignty. By joining the Court, states accept a supranational body 
with the authority to conduct its own investigations and trials, and to evaluate (and potentially 
intervene in) domestic legal proceedings. Yet the remit of the ICC extends even further, as the Court 
possesses the ability to exercise legal authority over even the nationals of non-party states under some 
conditions. As Nicole Deitelhoff has observed, 
 
[a]lthough the Rome statute formally establishes an institution, the ICC being designed to enforce 
the compliance with already existing norms, it also established a new norm: the duty of 
international prosecution of serious violations of humanitarian law…. This establishment of a duty 
to international prosecution, however, represents a sharp contrast to the earlier normative 
solution… which demanded that international crimes should be nationally prosecuted.1  
 
Thus the ICC is both a judicial institution—who’s development can be judged largely in relation to the 
volume of investigations and trials and their outcomes—and a political body, aimed at transforming 
the policies and behaviours of international actors. 
How then should we assess the influence of the International Criminal Court, given its internal 
complexities and multifaceted roles? Some observers are optimistic about the Court’s potential impact. 
For example, Antonio Franseschet has argued that “[t]he apparently strong endorsement of the ICC by 
a wide variety of states suggests that a reasonably wide consensus is now available on the ‘rule of law’ 
globally.”2 The progress associated with the ICC, and parallel ad-hoc tribunals, has led Lee and Price 
(among others) to conclude that “while incomplete and with significant shortcomings,” we are 
witnessing “the increasing criminalization of international and even domestic violent conflict and 
repression.”3 This view is reinforced by Sikkink’s recent study, among others.4 On the other hand, 
many sceptics remain unconvinced that the ICC will dramatically alter the calculations of states, or 
indeed that it has become sufficiently entrenched in the international system to withstand even modest 
challenges to its authority.5  
                                                     
1 Deitelhoff,“Isolated Hegemon,“ 151. 
2 Franseschet, “Global(izing) Justice,” 244. 
3 Lee and Price, “International Tribunals and the Criminalization of International Violence,” 123. 
4 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade. 
5 For example: Teitelbaum, “Statute of the International Criminal Court;” Smidt, “The International Criminal Court;” and 
O’Callaghan, “Is the International Criminal Court the Way Ahead?” 
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What view best captures the current status of the institution, and on what grounds should we 
render a judgement concerning its efficacy? A diverse literature has addressed the Court’s 
development in legal terms,6 yet the political dimensions of ICC influence have not been as 
systematically explored. To address this gap, the present paper aims to provide new evidence 
concerning the dissemination of international criminal law norms and their incorporation by states. 
This approach is valuable for a number of reasons. First, the process of internalizing international legal 
commitments into national law—what other scholars have termed “internalization”7 or 
“enmeshment”8—is necessary to allow states to participate fully in the legal regime established by the 
Rome Statute. “The ICC’s mandate is to promote domestic prosecutions of international crimes,”9 and 
national legislative change is the primary means by which this goal is realized. The incorporation of 
ICC crimes and procedures is the only way to ensure that states are able to undertake investigations 
and trials on their own territory and meet any requests for assistance from the Court or other actors, 
thereby relieving the ICC of the burden of attempting to adjudicate all potential cases.10 This national 
legal capacity is vital to the effective operation of the institution, and has been identified by the 
International Bar Association as “the missing link between the obligations within the Rome Statute 
and the implementation by States Parties.”11 
Domestic incorporation thus responds to the Statute’s foundational expectation that “it is the 
duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes.”12 Indeed, it was recognized early on that “if the ICC is to become a successful global court 
that prosecutes persons for international crimes notwithstanding the international political context, the 
adoption of the statute must usher in a sea change in national attitudes.”13 Legislative change is also a 
valuable indicator of national political will and the concomitant commitment to international norms, 
since it requires that state actors do something proactive in order to bring themselves in line with their 
legal obligations.14 National adoption of Rome Statute standards is thus key to the process of norm 
dispersion, and provides a window into the internalization of international norms that is not captured 
by reference to formal institutional membership or other forms of compliance. Incorporation is both 
practically beneficial, as it closes gaps in the international capacity to try serious crimes, and 
normatively important as it builds momentum behind a particular vision of the appropriate response to 
                                                     
6 See for example Mundis, “The Assembly of States Parties;” Kress, “‘Self-Referrals’ and ‘Waivers of Complementarity’;” 
McKay, “Characterising the System of the ICC;” Burke-White, “Implementing a System of Positive Complementarity;” 
Schabas, “‘Complementarity in Practice’;” and Sheppard, “The International Criminal Court Rome Statute.” See also the 
contributions to New Criminal Law Review 12(3) and (4) (2009). 
7 Koh, “Bringing International Law Home.” 
8 Kelly, “Enmeshment as a Theory of Compliance.” 
9 Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, 164. 
10 Amnesty International, International Criminal Court, 18; Robinson, “The Rome Statute and Its Impact,” 1861; Cryer, 
Prosecuting International Crimes, 164; Terracino, “National Implementation of ICC Crimes,” 422; ICCLR, International 
Criminal Court, 61; Bekou, “A Case for Review of Article 88,” 474-475 and 489; Ellis, “International Justice and the 
Rule of Law;” and Sikkink, Justice Cascade, 18-19.  
11 International Bar Association. IBA News Release, 1.  
12 Rome Statute, sixth preambular paragraph. To that end, the fourth preambular paragraph states that “the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution 
must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation”.  
13 Charney, “Progress in International Criminal Law?” 460. The central importance of implementing legislation is evidenced 
by its regular reference in high-level documents. See for example the Kampala Declaration. RC/Decl.1. June 1, 2010, 
operative paragraph 7. 
14 ICCLR, International Criminal Court, 12. The central importance of implementing legislation is evidenced by its regular 
reference in high-level documents. See for example the States Parties of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, Kampala Declaration RC/Decl.1, operative paragraph 7.  
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certain forms of international criminality. For these reasons, assessments of the ICC’s early impact 
should give more attention to the role of the Rome Statute in stimulating improvements in domestic 
laws and procedures, rather than focusing narrowly on the institutional development and judicial 
practice of the Court as an independent legal body.  
This paper proceeds in the following fashion. I first outline the key features of the ICC regime, 
and demonstrate the linkages to the particular concern with national legislative change. I then draw 
attention to some basic expectations concerning when domestic incorporation may be more or less 
likely. The balance of the paper shifts to empirical analysis. I briefly describe the development of a 
new dataset measuring national incorporation of core ICC norms, before proceeding to a detailed 
examination of the findings. In brief, I conclude that states have a poor track record of 
implementation, and consequently important gaps exist in the contemporary grave crimes regime. 
More specifically, the patterns of state incorporation appear to conform to my tentative hypotheses, 
suggesting that we should be able to anticipate key challenges and opportunities in future efforts to 
internalize international legal standards. 
 
The Meaning of the International Criminal Court 
The International Criminal Court is, at heart, an institution created by the international community 
with the responsibility “to try persons alleged to be responsible for the most serious crimes affecting 
the entire community as well as the peace, security, and well-being of the world.”15 As the 
constitutional document of the new Court, the Rome Statute codifies an extensive set of international 
humanitarian, criminal, and jurisprudential rules drawn from an array of treaty and customary sources, 
and creates a new mechanism for enforcing this resulting legal order. The ICC is the first permanent 
international court charged with trying individual human beings for acts of atrocity, and thus 
reinforces a recent expansion of international law to include individuals as subjects of criminal 
responsibility and punishment.16 In so doing, the Statute embeds a social expectation that judicial 
process and penal sanction constitute an appropriate response to grave international crimes.17  
Yet this general mandate can imply very different configurations of rights and responsibilities, 
and the particular structure of the Rome Statute, and resulting Court, represents one of a variety of 
potential responses to the challenge of how to enforce compliance with the grave crimes regime.18 The 
Statute creates a new norm of internationalized procedural justice: while national authorities retain the 
primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting atrocity crimes, they must do so via 
internationally-agreed standards of criminal law and with the oversight of a supra-national legal body. 
That body is itself able to investigate and prosecute when national authorities are unwilling or unable 
to do so. The principal innovation of the Rome Statute thus concerns the willingness of states to cede 
their exclusive right to prosecute their nationals to a permanent international body over which they 
cannot exercise complete control.  
 
[The] goal [of many delegates at the Rome negotiations] was to limit the future discretion of 
individual states by obligating them to support prosecutions under specified circumstances, and by 
                                                     
15 Bourgon, “Jurisdiction Ratione Loci,” 559.  
16 Rome Statute, Article 1. Dupuy, “International Criminal Responsibility;” Eser, “Individual Criminal Responsibility;” and 
Frulli, “Jurisdiction Ratione Personae.” 
17 Rome Statute, preamble paragraph 4. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, 5. A duty to criminal 
prosecution is now well established in customary and statutory international law, and is reflected in a number of widely 
adopted treaties. Tolbert and Wierda, ICTJ Briefing: Stocktaking, 2 and 7, n. 5.  
18 Ralph, Defending the Society of States, 21 and 101; Benedetti and Washburn, “Drafting the ICC Treaty,” 20 and 25. 
Indeed, as Struett points out, “[d]uring the negotiations [of the Rome Statute], a much wider range of approaches to 
constructing a permanent ICC was considered, with vastly different approaches to the powers, jurisdiction, and role of the 
new court.” Struett, The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court, 24-25. 
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shifting decision-making authority from national government officials to judges and prosecutors 
independent of any state or particular group of states. More broadly, their goal was to shape what 
governments will in the future consider acceptable behaviour. This effort (which is continuing) is 
political but also legal; it is an attempt to achieve political goals through law.19 
 
This represents a fundamental break with previous expectations in which the responsibility for 
enforcing international criminal law rested solely with the domestic legal processes of states. As such, 
this particular institutional solution embodies both the foundational normative commitment of the 
Rome Statute—as the appropriate means of ending impunity for grave crimes—and the principal 
point of contestation in the international community. 
A primary consideration in the construction of the Rome regime was the scope of its mandate 
– what acts and actors should properly fall under the aegis of the Court. The ICC has jurisdiction over 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and—at some point after 2017—the crime of 
aggression.20 These core crimes are understood as the most serious forms of organized violence in the 
international system, to be distinguished from other types of international criminal activity like piracy, 
drug trafficking, and so on.21 The distinct intentionality, scale, and context of the constituent acts—
like murder, rape, and kidnapping—means that they should be regarded as a particularly egregious 
class of behaviours and not treated as simply more expansive instances of “common” crimes under 
existing domestic laws.22 The inclusion of certain crimes (with the necessary exclusion of others) thus 
elevates these acts and invests them with particular opprobrium. Yet these decisions were not 
especially innovative or controversial on the aggregate, since the Statute for the most part reflects 
established international customary and treaty-based law, as well as the practice of recent ad-hoc 
criminal tribunals.23 The acts constituting genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (though 
notably not aggression), and the related modes of responsibility were therefore largely settled by the 
time of the 1998 Rome Conference.24 One of the significant contributions of the Statute is thus to 
bring together disparate strands of international law under a single legal architecture. In so doing, the 
Rome Statute helps to consolidate international legal practice both by reaffirming the special status of 
these crimes and by adding greater precision to their substantive definitions.  
The Court is further predicated on the assertion that all perpetrators—no matter their official 
role—must be held accountable for the serious crimes under the Court’s purview. To that end, the 
Rome Statute deviates from previous practice by rejecting legal immunity for Heads of State and other 
political figures, thereby reversing prior diplomatic norms concerning the special legal status of certain 
                                                     
19 Wippman, “The International Criminal Court,” 160.  
20 Rome Statute, Articles 5-8. An amendment to the Rome Statute operationalizing the crime of aggression was adopted at 
the Review Conference in Kampala, Uganda. Review Conference, Resolution RC/Res.6: “The Crime of Aggression.”  
21 van den Wyngaert and Dugard, “Non-Applicability of Statute of Limitations,” 886; Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and 
International Law, 4. 
22 Lee, “States’ Responses,” 25. However, Terracino does note that as a point of procedural law, the reliance on existing 
“ordinary” crimes under domestic law would not be sufficient to trigger a complementarity challenge by the Court. 
Terracino, “National Implementation of ICC Crimes,” 437-438. 
23 Especially the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols of 1977, and the Genocide Convention, in the case of 
the former, and the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia in the case of the latter. The 
Rome Statute represents compromise solution and is thus less progressive on some matters than existing statutory and 
customary international law. For a good discussion of differences between the Rome Statute and other international 
criminal law sources, particularly concerning the definition of crimes, jurisdiction, and modes of liability, see Amnesty 
International, International Criminal Court, 7-16. 
24 The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR), International 
Criminal Court, 2, 6-7, and 72-3. The Statute does advance the law in some important respects, as with gender and sexual 
violence crimes and the rights of victims in legal proceedings. For a fuller discussion, see footnote 78, below. 
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high officials.25 This innovation is complicated by the fact that the Statute also accommodates, and 
thus implicitly acknowledges the legitimacy of, established international obligations between states 
concerning these same forms of immunity.26 Hence this principle remains contentious, as I show 
below. Finally, the Rome Statute adopts two forms of jurisdiction that apply to acts committed by the 
nationals of a State Party (on any territory), or by any individuals on the territory of a State Party 
(regardless of nationality).27 This latter form is regarded as highly controversial by some states, as it 
exposes the nationals of non-parties to the authority of the Court.  
The more particular institutional architecture of the ICC comes in three principal parts, 
concerning the “fundamental implementing obligations”28 of cooperation and complementarity, as 
well as the modalities by which the Court can assert its authority over crimes in the international 
system. First, states—primarily parties to the Rome Statute but also all UN members in instances of a 
Security Council referral—have a legal obligation to “cooperate fully with the Court in its 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”29 This requires that the 
status and legal personality of the Court’s constituent entities, as well as the privileges and immunities 
of its staff, be duly recognized in national law.30 Compliance with the obligation to cooperate also 
involves a host of more specific expectations, including on matters of arresting and surrendering 
suspects, providing evidence and documentation, enforcing sentences, and other means of support.31  
National implementation is instrumental to the proper functioning of the ICC as an 
international legal institution. Since the Court does not possess its own police force, the enforcement 
of criminal law necessarily relies on the active cooperation of states. Yet this cooperation involves 
complex legal and bureaucratic arrangements implicating constitutional, judicial, and diplomatic 
practices and as such, is not easily addressed in an ad-hoc fashion. As Lee points out, “many of the 
Statute provisions are not self-executing or may be in conflict with the existing law.”32 Without a clear 
articulation of the relevant legal procedures, states are likely to find that some requests from the Court 
or other states cannot be undertaken due to complications with (for example) the transfer of sensitive 
documents, extradition of nationals to third parties and mandated immunities for senior political 
figures.33 
Second, the ICC only possesses a limited capacity to investigate and prosecute cases, and so 
relies in large measure on the effective pursuit of justice at the national level. To organize this division 
of labour, the Rome Statute creates a new principle of complementarity whereby the Court shall defer 
                                                     
25 Rome Statute, Article 27. Also Gaeta, “Official Capacity and Immunities.” 
26 Rome Statute, Article 98. A good overview is provided in Akande, “International Law Immunities.” 
27 Rome Statute, Article 12.2. See also Bourgon, “Jurisdiction Ratione Loci.” The Statute does not include a more expansive 
assertion of authority via “universal jurisdiction,” a decision that negotiators believed would increase the acceptability of 
the resulting Statute by retaining a more modest reach for the new institution. 
28 Amnesty International, International Criminal Court, 5. 
29 Rome Statute, Article 86. 
30 Rome Statute, Articles 3.3, 4, and 48, This includes the Office of the Prosecutor, Registry, Presidency and the Pre-Trial, 
Trial and Appeals Divisions. See Amnesty International, International Criminal Court, 19. 
31 Rome Statute, Articles 86-102 and 103-111. Ciampi, “Other Forms of Cooperation.” While the Statute (especially Article 
88) does not determine how the obligation to cooperate will be operationalized in national law, it does require that 
domestic jurisdictions accommodate all necessary procedures to facilitate Court requests. However, “[a]ccording to a 
well-established principle of international law, a State may not invoke provisions (or absence of provisions) of its internal 
law in order to avoid compliance with international obligations.” Ciampi, “The Obligation to Cooperate,” 1621-1622; 
also Gaeta, “Official Capacity and Immunities,” 999. 
32 Lee, “States’ Responses,” 42-43. “Those States Parties that have seriously examined the question of implementation have 
come to the unanimous conclusion that, regardless of their legal tradition or normal practice, the Statute requires some 
form of domestic implementing legislation.” ICCLR, International Criminal Court, 13.  
33 See for example Meersschaert Duchens, “Monaco, A Haven;” Farer, “Restraining the Barbarians,” 109-110. 
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to states “unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution.”34 The expectation is that justice can best be realized by transforming national criminal 
systems, and not by centralizing legal activity within the Court itself.35 States must therefore ensure 
that their national laws address all relevant aspects of the criminal law regime set out in the Rome 
Statute, particularly by adopting ICC crimes as well as the Court’s jurisdictional regime, eliminating 
all immunities, and implementing appropriate criminal law procedures, including forms of criminal 
liability36, fair trial standards37, and specific modalities of criminal investigation and prosecution.38 
The broader purpose of the ICC regime is thus to facilitate the application of international 
criminal law to domestic jurisdictions and thereby create a homogenous legal regime. As Kleffner has 
pointed out, the principle of complementarity “provides for a supervision of national criminal courts, 
supported by the threat that they relinquish the primary right to exercise jurisdiction if they fail to meet 
the relevant [Rome Statute] requirements.”39 This produces a strong incentive towards legal 
standardization in order to meet the criteria of complementarity:  
 
the more a national legal process approximates that of the ICC… the greater the likelihood that 
this process will be palatable and pass muster. This, in turn, suggests that… national institutions 
will model themselves along the lines of the ICC in order to maximize their jurisdiction. 
Complementarity, therefore, may encourage heterogeneity in terms of the number of institutions 
adjudicating international crimes, but homogeneity in terms of the process they follow and the 
punishment they mete out.40 
 
Domestic incorporation of the Rome Statute is thus a principal metric of national judicial capacity. It 
is for these reasons that scholars and practitioners have identified improvements in domestic legal 
practice, rather than the Court’s own judicial operations, as a crucial indicator of the ICC’s influence 
over international efforts to end impunity for grave crimes.41  
When taken together, the configuration of actors and responsibilities enshrined in the Rome 
Statute constitutes a particular institutional solution to the problem of how to effectively punish, and 
potentially deter, the most heinous international crimes. At the same time, the Statute also articulates a 
vision of appropriate behaviour wherein states are obliged to investigate and prosecute grave 
violations of international humanitarian and human rights law via agreed international procedures. 
This structure of state obligations overseen by a supranational authority is the basis for what I have 
                                                     
34 Rome Statute, Article 17.1(a). See also Terracino, “National Implementation of ICC Crimes,” 431-437.  
35 This intention is articulated in the Preamble (especially paragraphs 4, 6 and 10) as well as Articles 1 and 17 of the Rome 
Statute.  
36 Rome Statute, Articles 22-33. 
37 Rome Statute, Articles 62-67.  
38 Rome Statute, Articles 86-102. See also Amnesty International, International Criminal Court, 7-18. 
39 Kleffner, “The Impact of Complementarity,” 113.  
40 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, 143; similarly, see Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, 148-9 
and 164; and Ambos and Stegmiller, “German Research on International Criminal Law,” 184. As such, implementing 
legislation for the ICC can be thought of as an expression of sovereignty, as “[states] have criminalized the Statute crimes 
into their national laws in order to ensure that investigation and prosecution can take place under their jurisdiction.” Lee, 
“States’ Responses,” 23; Olugbuo, “Positive Complementarity,” 262. This point was explicitly recognized by the British 
government in its own implementation process. See Bowers, The International Criminal Court Bill, 61.  
41 Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court, 167; and Rastan, “The responsibility to enforce,” 179. “As a 
consequence of complementarity, the number of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure its efficiency. On the 
contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, 
would be a major success.” Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Speech, 2.  
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termed the new internationalized procedural justice norm, and serves as the reference point against 
which state change is measured. 
 
Patterns of Domestic Legal Change 
A key question for the proceeding analysis, therefore, is whether any regularity can be discerned in the 
ways in which the Rome Statute has been incorporated by states. Making such judgements first 
requires some theoretically informed expectations about what patterns are likely to obtain – what types 
of norms should be most susceptible to domestic uptake, and to what types of actors (in this case 
states) does this apply? The starting point for this effort is to conceptualize the international system as 
an expansive network of interconnected and overlapping principles, norms and rules that collectively 
govern relations between actors. Formal multilateral treaties like the Rome Statute are one part of this 
matrix. In particular, treaties act as focal points in the development of international norms42 that are 
formalized as legal rules “constitut[ing] specific applications of norms to particular situations.”43 The 
treaty-making process thus helps to clarify the content and scope of these constituent standards of 
appropriate behaviour. Hence while only part of the larger process of norm-building, multilateral 
treaties are a prominent way in which intersubjective social standards may be generated within the 
international system. Yet treaties do not exist in isolation, but are themselves informed by existing 
principles, norms and rules. As such, new agreements are created in the shadow of a much larger 
network of social expectations that structure international practice. The development of international 
norms thus often occurs by analogy, as new standards are associated with (and measured against) prior 
norms and rules that hold broader sway.44 This quality of social embeddedness—the ability to draw on 
an established legal and political legacy—provides multilateral treaties with a source of legitimacy and 
authority, while at the same time leaving room for substantial contestation. 
A series of general hypotheses flows from this theoretical framework. First, since treaties 
serve as focal points for clarifying new standards of appropriate behaviour for members of the formal 
treaty community, these states should on balance be much more amenable to these new norms. 
Therefore, we should expect that ICC State Parties will incorporate a greater number of Rome Statute 
norms into their domestic legislation. Yet there may well be variance within this broad group as well. 
More specifically, states with the strongest affinity with existing international humanitarian and 
criminal law norms are best placed to draw connections with historical antecedents to bolster the 
contemporary legitimacy and obligatory status of the Court. Hence early-adopters of the Rome 
Statute—as with the Like Minded Group of states that led the negotiations for the Court—should also 
exhibit particularly high rates of ICC incorporation. Conversely, conflict-prone states should on 
balance be less compliant for two reasons. On the one hand, the presence of armed conflict increases 
the burden of new legal constraints, since there is an increased likelihood of atrocities being 
committed and consequently a higher risk of exposure to ICC jurisdiction among senior political and 
military leaders. This, in turn, will raise the costs of potential compliance. On the other hand, the 
deterioration of bureaucratic capacity often associated with intra-state (civil) conflicts makes the 
transformation of domestic institutions more difficult.  
At the same time, because treaties are part of a wider legal and social web, they may generate 
informal compliance and adaptation, even among non-party states. On the one hand, states may 
modify their laws in anticipation of a future ratification or accession, or to meet the standards of 
complementarity, and thus forestall the potential reach of the Court via a UN Security Council 
                                                     
42 I follow the conventional definition of norms as “collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity.” 
Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity and Culture,” 54.  
43 Cortell and Davis, Jr., “How Do International Institutions Matter,” 452. Thus, international law constitutes “the most 
codified, formal subset of norms.” Sandholtz and Stiles, International Norms, 1.  
44 Lowe, “The Politics of Law-Making,” 208. 
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referral.45 In such cases, national laws reflect an increasing parity with international standards 
embodied in the Rome Statute even as these same states remain outside of the formal legal 
community. For example, Rwanda’s Law No. 33 bis (2003) incorporates the definitions of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes almost in their entirety, and additionally adopts the modalities 
for commander responsibility and the elimination of personal immunities as articulated in the Rome 
Statute.46 On the other hand, core features of the ICC legal regime—most especially core crimes and 
modes of jurisdiction—largely pre-date the Rome Statute and thus may already be found in the 
national laws of some non-parties. The connection to prior (and more broadly accepted) norms and 
rules can provide the basis for drawing ambivalent states toward new legal innovations. Determining 
the extent of existing concordance between the Rome Statute and the domestic laws of non-party 
states is thus an important empirical contribution to an account of legal impact. 
The broader implication of this theoretical account is that legacy effects have an important 
conditioning effect on the acceptance of new international norms. Price has previously argued that 
“the development and implementation of new norms… are more likely to be successful to the extent 
they can be grafted on to previously accepted norms.”47 As such, we should expect that features of the 
Rome Statute that most closely follow established legal practice should enjoy the widest acceptance 
and consequently most frequent incorporation in domestic law. Conversely, newer international 
norms—those that lack an established legacy or most obviously diverge from previous precedent—are 
likely to be incorporated more slowly and contested more heavily.  
 
A New ICC Legislation Database 
In order to capture the current extent of national legislative concordance with the Rome Statute, I 
developed an original dataset that tracks the presence or absence of ICC features in the domestic law 
of 196 states. A few studies have previously sought to measure and assess national incorporation of 
the Rome Statute, but these have tended to focus on a limited number of states,48 or have sought to 
quantify the existence (rather than detailed content) of legal developments.49 To my knowledge, this 
paper presents the first systematic evaluation of implementing legislation in a global context.  
Rather than attempting to assess the status of every element of the Rome Statute, I identify a 
more modest set of indicators classified under the rubrics of “cooperation” and “complementarity” that 
address primary aspects of the broader legal agreement. In doing so, I have selected those features that 
are most central to the Statute’s purpose and operation, and that represent particularly consequential or 
challenging commitments for states to observe. In this way, I seek to assess the implementation of ICC 
norms under the most difficult conditions. This process yielded 12 main indicators: six concerning 
complementarity (jurisdiction, immunity, commander responsibility, and the core crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes) and six addressing cooperation (obligation to cooperate, 
special legal status of the Court, obstruction of justice, arrest and surrender, provision of documents, 
and enforcement of Court sentences). These were further informed by an extensive set of sub-
indicators.  
This analysis is based on a comparison of the text of the Rome Statute with the language of 
domestic laws, both specific ICC implementing legislation and, where applicable, prior criminal 
                                                     
45 Kleffner, “Impact of Complementarity,” 109-112. 
46 Republic of Rwanda, Law No. 33 bis/2003.  
47 Price, “Transnational Civil Society,” 584. 
48 Terracino, “National Implementation of ICC Crimes.” Representative studies of include Relva, “The Implementation of the 
Rome Statute in Latin American States;” Neuner, ed. National Legislation Incorporating International Crimes; various 
contributions to the Journal of International Criminal Justice 2, no. 1 (2004); Ambos and Stegmiller, “German 
Research;” and du Plessis and Ford, eds. Unable or Unwilling? Generally, see Kleffner, “Impact of Complementarity.” 
49 Amnesty International, Rome Statute Implementation Report Card. 
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codes. In some instances, legislation incorporating other international agreements, especially the 
Genocide Convention, Geneva Conventions and Convention Against Torture, is included. This 
attention to formal legal texts is a useful since the documents reflect official state policy, and can be 
compared against the laws of other states and external standards. The relevant documents were derived 
from a series of external databases; coding was undertaken in October and November 2011. The 
Appendix provides greater detail concerning data sources, the operationalization of individual 
indicators and their aggregation. 
A couple of further points are necessary before turning to the findings. This dataset is 
principally concerned with determining the extent to which core ICC norms have found their way into 
national legal environments. Their presence in national laws would suggest a widening web of state 
adherence, but this does not itself indicate causation. In many cases the decision to join the Rome 
Statute stimulated a process of legislative change, as states sought to close gaps in their ability to 
investigate and prosecute ICC crimes. However, the majority of states have thus far not completed this 
process, so a simple measure of the existence (or not) of an ICC implementation law is insufficient. It 
is also possible that such changes actually precede, and are unconnected to, the Statute itself—as with 
many states incorporating the crime of genocide well before 1998—and under such circumstances 
would not demonstrate endorsement of the Rome Statute per se. At the same time, the precise manner 
in which implementation occurs—whether through stand-alone legislation specifically incorporating 
the Rome Statute, or via various forms of ad-hoc modification of existing laws—will vary with the 
circumstances in each state.50  
It is also important to acknowledge that this dataset is not exhaustive. My focus on national 
legislation explicitly excludes other potentially relevant legal sources, including military manuals and 
codes of conduct. Such sources are often not available as public documents, and so for reasons of 
consistency are not included here. Every effort was made to locate relevant legislation for each state, 
but in some instances no such documents could be uncovered within reasonable search parameters.51 
In the absence of available information, states are coded as non-compliant (i.e., the particular indicator 
is not present) with the hope that this dataset can be expanded during subsequent research. 
Despite these drawbacks, establishing the status of particular ICC features in national law is 
valuable for assessing the contemporary scope of the Court as an institutional structure and its 
associated status as an international norm – that is, as the socially-accepted means of addressing grave 
criminality. Though the Rome Statute relies heavily on prior legal developments, the treaty itself can 
be said to have independent effects on state behaviour to the extent that its emergence can be 
correlated with subsequent changes in national law in response to the commitments enshrined in the 
treaty text. Conversely, the absence of other legal features leaves gaps in the web of legal authority 
that will impact the ability of states to investigate and prosecute ICC subject crimes, and limits the 
scope of a parallel norm concerning the punishment of grave crimes via this particular model of 
procedural justice.  
 
National Legislation and the Incorporation of ICC Norms  
 
Overview: Global Patterns of Legislative Change 
In this section I briefly summarize the general trends concerning global incorporation of ICC norms. 
For each state—both State Parties and non-parties—an aggregate compliance score was generated by 
combining the results from the 12 main indicators. These were weighted equally, and this composite 
                                                     
50 ICCLR, International Criminal Court, 13; Robinson, “Rome Statute and Its Impact on National Law,” 1850-1851; Lee, 
“States’ Responses,” 29-33. 
51 The present dataset contains 60 states (of 196 coded) for which substantive information is unavailable for more than 50% 
of the included indicators. These can be distinguished from instances where the author was able to confirm that relevant 
national legal provisions do not exist. 
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measure gives a snapshot of relative adherence on a state-by-state basis across the international 
system. This first cut reveals that thus far, there has been only modest incorporation of ICC norms in 
national legislation. 58 of the 121 State Parties have enacted new laws, or amended existing ones, in 
order to specifically address some or all of the relevant Rome Statute provisions.52 State Parties have 
an average score of 4.75 out of a possible 12; this equates to a nearly 40% implementation rate. Hence 
the transmission of international legal standards is occurring slowly, even for those states that have 
formally endorsed the treaty. Table 1 summarizes these trends; “n” represents the number of states in 
the given category, while “#” reflects the absolute point total, and “%” translates this into percentage 
form (out of 12 possible points). 
 
Table 1: Overview of ICC Compliance 
 n # % 
 
States Parties 
 
 
121 
 
4.75 
 
39.58 
 
Signatories 
 
 
31 
 
0.80 
 
6.67 
 
Non- Parties 
 
 
44 
 
0.91 
 
7.58 
 
 
Some relevant patterns are visible within this aggregate data. Of the 39 states with implementation 
scores of 7 or above, 33 were members of the Like-Minded Group of states that—along with civil 
society actors—stewarded the negotiations for an independent Court.53 This fact speaks to the view 
that extensive incorporation of legal obligations is most likely in states that are already deeply 
committed to the objectives of the treaty. However, unlike those (predominantly rationalist) scholars 
that regard endogeneity as a mark against the independent power of legal processes and norms,54 I 
argue in my other work that the negotiation of the Statute was itself a constitutive moment in which 
state identities and interests were reconfigured in favour of an independent Court, and that this 
intersubjective process has facilitated subsequent compliance.55 Indeed, there is ample evidence that 
national implementation has contributed to broader societal transformations. For example, “[t]he 
passing of the ICC Act was momentous: prior to the ICC Act, South Africa had no municipal 
legislation on the subject of war crimes or crimes against humanity, and no domestic prosecutions of 
international crimes had taken place in South Africa.”56 This is similarly the case for a number of 
                                                     
52 Amnesty International 2010, Rome Statute Implementation Report Card. Since the release of this report, Uganda has 
passed an ICC implementation law. Also Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Ratification and Implementation 
Overview.  
53 Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Georgia, Germany, Ireland, Korean Republic, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Samoa, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago and the 
United Kingdom. In total, 68 states are commonly considered part of the Like-Minded Group. The full list is found in 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Statute of the ICC, 110. 
54 Prominent expressions are found in Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, “Good News About Compliance;” and Hathaway, “Do 
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” 
55 See Bower, Norm Development Without the Great Powers, especially 180-188 and 243-249. 
56 du Plessis, The International Criminal Court That Africa Wants, 8. Also Stone, “Implementation of the Rome Statute,” 
307. 
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states in Latin America, including Argentina.57 In such cases, the Rome Statute—defined by its 
legalistic criteria of rules and procedures and association with prior international humanitarian and 
human rights law—is now taken as the embodiment of a new standard of appropriate behaviour, as 
anticipated by earlier works on the genesis of the ICC regime.58 
Interestingly, the presence of ongoing violence does not impede the incorporation of ICC 
features as much as might be expected. Overall, the 64 State Parties involved in some form of armed 
conflict since 1998 have considerably higher rates of adherence than treaty members in general, 
averaging 52% (6.25 points). This compares with an average incorporation rate of 32% (4.37) when 
accounting for the full 103 conflict-prone states during the same period. A good deal of this observed 
difference can be attributed to early supporters of the ICC—including Canada, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom—who participated in coalition military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, 
in some cases the experience of internal armed conflict has led to greater engagement with the Court 
and an increased sensitivity to the legal standards contained in the Rome Statute. For example, 
Uganda’s incorporation score is a near-perfect 11.5, which is owing to the fact that the 2010 
International Criminal Court Bill is explicitly modelled on the Statute and integrates many provisions 
directly from the treaty text.59 Anecdotal evidence suggests that Ugandan officials modified the ICC 
Bill in specific ways to conform to the Statute.60 Hence challenging circumstances do not necessarily 
undermine state compliance, and may in fact provide the impetus for legal change.61 More broadly, 
this brief account confirms a view that State Parties will often invoke the legal criteria of the treaty as 
the benchmark against which they measure their own conformity with community expectations.  
Unsurprisingly, the extent of implementation among non-parties is extremely low, with these 
states averaging an approximately 8% rate of incorporation (0.9 points). This is principally owing to 
the fact that national legislative change is typically stimulated by a decision to join the Court. For this 
reason it is somewhat surprising that compliance among signatories is slightly lower than for non-
parties, at a little under 7% (0.8 points out of 12). We would expect to see greater internalization of 
Rome Statute norms among those states that, by their signature, have indicated their intention to join 
the institution. This finding suggests that, in the case of the ICC, legislative change and the 
incorporation of international norms rarely occurs in advance of formal membership.  
The global overview demonstrates only limited progress in applying Rome Statute norms at 
the national level. This serves to highlight the difficulties, noted by various authors, in translating 
behavioural injunctions found in international treaties into domestic legal contexts.62 These general 
findings therefore suggest important limits on the extent to which current national laws will permit 
states to undertake investigations and trials and cooperate with ICC proceedings. A more fine-grained 
analysis reveals particular patterns within this general compliance picture, as detailed below. 
 
                                                     
57 Garcia Falconi, “Codification of Crimes Against Humanity,” 454. 
58 Fehl, “Explaining the International Criminal Court;” Schiff, Building the ICC; Struett, The Politics of Constructing the 
ICC; Deitelhoff, “Isolated Hegemon.” 
59 Parliament of Uganda, International Criminal Court Bill. See also New Vision, “MPs pass ICC Bill.” 
60 New Vision, “MPs pass ICC Bill.” Mufumba, “ICC Bill.”  
61 Lyons and Reed-Hurtado, “Colombia,” 2.  
62 For example, “the implementation of the Rome Statute in Latin America continues to face structural gaps caused by a lack 
of comprehensive implementation of all the elements of the treaty.” Carrasco, “Implementation of War Crimes in Latin 
America,” 462. Similarly, “[w]hile African states have been at the forefront in ratifying the Rome Statute, the progress on 
domestic implementation of the Statute has been rather slow…. [D]raft implementing legislation exists in several African 
countries but only a few countries have passed domesticating statutes to date.” Nkhata, “Implementation of the Rome 
Statute,” 283-284.  
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Complementarity 
As noted already, the ICC regime is predicated on a burden-sharing arrangement in which states take 
on the majority of responsibility for legal enforcement, but under conditions set by the Rome Statute. 
It is therefore incumbent upon State Parties to incorporate ICC subject crimes, as well as jurisdiction 
and modalities of individual criminal responsibility (elimination of immunity and incorporation of 
principle of command responsibility), into their domestic laws so as to enable this division of labour. 
As Figure 1 documents, however, a great deal of work remains to be done in this regard. To this point, 
State Parties have a compliance rate of close to 44%, an average of 2.65 of the 6 complementarity 
indicators. The extension of Rome Statute norms outside of the formal treaty community remains 
extremely low: current signatories average a 12% rate of incorporation (0.73 out of 6), while non-
parties again score slightly higher at 15% (0.90 out of 6). These patterns mirror the aggregate view 
presented above, and reaffirm the observation that early supporters are much more likely to 
incorporate ICC obligations, albeit incompletely. 
 
Figure 1: National Implementation of Complementarity Indicators 
 
 
There are thus important limits in the extent to which the constituent ICC norms and rules are gaining 
traction in domestic law, and how much of the observed incorporation can be attributed to new laws 
specifically implementing the Rome Statute. At the time of writing, 56 states have fully incorporated 
the dual (territorial and national) modes of jurisdiction envisioned in the Rome Statute, of which 42 
have done so via specific ICC implementing legislation. A further 50 states have partially recognized 
the jurisdictional basis of the Court, by including either the territorial or the national modality, or by 
incorporating both in an incomplete fashion.63 In total, 106 states have met at least part of the 
                                                     
63 As explained in the Appendix, I code the “jurisdiction” indicator in relation to those for “genocide,” “crimes against 
humanity,” and “war crimes”: the former was only coded as “present” in my dataset if the state in question also had 
incorporated a significant number of ICC crimes. While every domestic criminal code has a provision for crimes 
committed on state territory (territorial jurisdiction), this is only relevant if jurisdiction can be asserted over the types of 
crimes outlined in the Rome Statute. 
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jurisdictional precondition for addressing Rome Statute crimes in their domestic legal systems; this 
figure includes 26 states that are not presently members of the Court.64 This reflects the fact that the 
modes of jurisdiction were already recognized norms of international law before the advent of the 
Rome Statute, and were thus among the most likely to be present in the national laws of non-parties.  
The assertion of the complete “irrelevance of official capacity” is at the heart of the Rome 
Statute’s commitment to universal justice. The extent of state endorsement of this new standard is an 
especially important indication of norm diffusion, since the elimination of immunities for senior 
political leaders reverses previous international practice and implicates the very people making these 
international commitments, and thus represents an especially significant form of state change. Yet the 
Rome Statute also maintains the long-established principle that states will respect the legal immunities 
of certain political and diplomatic actors in their international relations, and therefore enshrines two 
apparently contradictory standards for how to govern sensitive questions of legal culpability. Here the 
dataset reveals among the most limited degrees of progress: thus far, only 32 states have fully 
incorporated the immunity standard articulated in Article 27 of the Rome Statute, while a further four 
have modified their laws in partial adherence to this new rule.65 Significantly, the vast majority (27 
instances) of these changes have come via specific implementing legislation by State Parties. This 
reflects the fact that, unlike some other metrics included in this dataset, the Rome Statute is a principal 
source for this emergent standard and would be a key driver of any future consolidation of an anti-
immunity norm.66 The evidence presented here thus also suggests that newer international norms are 
also likely to be incorporated more slowly and contested more heavily, a finding that corresponds with 
previous hypotheses in the IR literature. 
Closely related is the principle of command responsibility, which was already well established 
as a rule of customary international law.67 Here again we find only limited evidence of incorporation 
in national law, with 39 states having fully domesticated the Rome Statute standard, and six having 
done so in an incomplete manner. And, as with the principle of immunity, the vast majority of this 
legal change is undertaken by State Parties (38 of 46 cases) via ICC-specific national legislation (30 of 
46 cases). This is yet another example of the limited domestic incorporation of international norms, in 
this case despite a substantial prior legacy. 
Equally important to efficacy of the ICC regime is the widespread adoption of the crimes 
under the Rome Statute, since in their absence states are unable to meet their responsibility to address 
“the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.”68 As above, the 
record is decidedly mixed. Genocide69 is the most consistently incorporated crime, and features in the 
available laws of 105 states, including 26 states that are presently not members of the Court. However, 
this owes less to the Rome Statute itself than it does the widespread acceptance of the prior Genocide 
Convention, from which the Rome Statute derives its definition in Article 6.70 Hence, while 79 ICC 
State Parties have incorporated the crime of genocide, only 55 of those have some form of 
                                                     
64 16 non-parties and 10 signatories. 
65 Prominent ICC proponents including France have yet to incorporate the provisions of Article 27 into their domestic laws, 
while others like Colombia have retained the ability to provide amnesties and pardons. On the debate surrounding 
Uganda’s removal of immunities in line with Article 27, see Mufumba, “ICC Bill.” 
66 Interestingly, three states—Armenia, Egypt, and Rwanda—have domestic laws that parallel the spirit of Article 27 even as 
all three remain non-parties to the Rome Statute. 
67 Ambos, “Superior Responsibility,” 846-847. 
68 Rome Statute, Article 5(1). 
69 See Cassese, “Genocide.” 
70 In virtually every case, states have incorporated the operative language of the definition of genocide in its totality directly 
from either the Convention or Rome Statute. The only apparent exceptions are Guinea-Bissau, Saint Lucia and 
Uzebekistan. 
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implementing legislation relating to the Statute, which in a number of cases does not address subject 
crimes at all. And, while genocide is the most widely domesticated crime, it is still only present in 
54% states with national laws accessible for this study.71 This finding is especially relevant for two 
reasons. On the one hand, the modest incorporation of the Genocide Convention—a treaty that has 
been in existence for over 60 years and is widely ratified72—gives some perspective to the 
comparative experience of ICC implementation. On the other hand, the fact that a foundational norm 
of contemporary international society—what international lawyers term a jus cogens norm—has not 
received greater incorporation in national law provides an important qualification for the expectation 
that more established international standards will diffuse more widely. 
The Rome Statute formulations of crimes against humanity and war crimes are even less 
prominent in domestic legislation.73 Fifty-four states have fully incorporated the definition of crimes 
against humanity found in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, while five have internalized some aspects 
while leaving others out. Unlike genocide, crimes against humanity are most often incorporated via 
new national implementing legislation (45 out of 59 cases)74; this makes sense since there is no stand-
alone convention defining and regulating this category of international crimes and so the Rome Statute 
is the most obvious legal source on this subject.75 Many states already criminalize some or all of the 
constituent crimes encompassed in Article 7 (such as murder, torture, or rape) domestically, but not 
necessarily as part of a “widespread or systematic attack” “directed against a civilian population,” with 
the further caveats that it be composed of “multiple commissions” of the acts and be executed 
“pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy.” These distinctions are important, as 
they collectively represent the principal difference between “ordinary” crimes and those of the 
normatively distinct “grave crimes” regime encapsulated by the ICC. The Like-Minded Group 
accounts for 65% (35 of the 54 cases) of the full incorporation of this standard, as would be expected 
given the earlier discussion. Most interesting are those states—including the Central African Republic, 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia, the Philippines and Uganda—that have 
incorporated crimes against humanity in the midst of internal armed conflicts that have featured 
allegations of precisely these kinds of acts by rebel groups and/or state security forces. Other conflict-
prone states like Azerbaijan, Burundi, Georgia and Rwanda have similarly implemented the crimes of 
Article 7 in their national law. These cases provide among the best examples of instances where states 
have endorsed legal rules under circumstances where legal exposure is most plausible, thus raising the 
prospective costs (and benefits) of compliance.  
There are clear patterns to instances of partial compliance as well. Most notably, certain 
categories of less established crimes are much less likely to feature in domestic legislation. This 
                                                     
71 As McKay notes, “[d]espite a requirement under the Genocide Convention that States Parties ‘enact . . . the necessary 
legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention…’ many States parties… had not done so, claiming 
that their domestic laws were adequate to address the crime. Many of these same states have now been prompted to 
finally do so when faced with ratifying the Rome Statute, therefore ensuring that they will be able to fulfill their 
undertakings under the Genocide Convention to prevent and punish acts of genocide.” McKay, “Characterising the 
System of the International Criminal Court,” 270-271. 
72 As of June 2012 there are 142 State Parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en.  
73 Bothe, “War Crimes;” Byron, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity; Cassese, “Crimes Against Humanity.” 
74 The other 14 states—including six non-member states—that have adopted crimes against humanity in some form have 
done so presumably by referencing the widely-accepted definition under customary international law, which the Rome 
Statute essentially mimics. Regarding the customary development of crimes against humanity, see Cassese, “Crimes 
Against Humanity.” 
75 Lee, “States’ Responses,” 26; Sadat, ed., Forging a Convention for Crimes Against Humanity; Robinson, “Defining 
‘Crimes Against Humanity’,” 53-54 and 56. Crimes against humanity were first articulated at the Nuremburg Tribunal. 
Aspects of the Rome Statute definition were drawn from this experience as well as developments at the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, though these prior legal initiatives were not previously codified.  
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finding can be connected back to the negotiation of the Rome Statute, since a prominent view held that 
only those acts already recognized under customary international law at the time of the Statute’s 
creation—i.e., “crimes that constitute a common concern of the international community and are 
universally considered to be the most serious”— should be included in the final document.76 Of the 
five states that have incorporated only some aspects of Article 7, all have failed to include the sub-
clauses relating to sexual crimes and the crime of apartheid, which are among these more recent and 
controversial innovations.77 Three of these—Albania, Estonia, and Niger—are State Parties with 
implementing legislation specifically addressing ICC crimes, which suggests that the exclusions are 
the result of deliberate policy. 
Finally, the Rome Statute draws together a wide body of prior international humanitarian law 
in formulating a single omnibus definition of war crimes. Despite its legacy, the full scope of this 
article has not yet widely permeated national legal settings. To this point, 56 states have fully 
internalized Article 8 in their domestic laws, with 13 states reflecting a partial incorporation. Here 
again national implementing legislation is one important vector for legal change: 43 states have 
incorporated some or all of Article 8 through ICC legislation, while others have evidently done so via 
other legal processes (for example, by ratifying and implementing the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
1977 Additional Protocols, and other legal instruments such as the 1954 Convention for the Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict).78 Most ICC non-members thus have at least 
some Article 8 crimes in their domestic laws.  
This general pattern is most pronounced in the context of crimes that are especially 
controversial or have been less clearly codified in previous international humanitarian law, and thus 
are in a greater state of flux. It is in these instances that the Rome Statute would most clearly be a 
force for the progressive consolidation of social expectations within the grave crimes regime. For 
example, 54 states have incorporated the language of Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) rendering sexual offences as 
war crimes in international armed conflict.79 Similarly, 60 have implemented the rule prohibiting the 
recruitment of child soldiers in times of international war.80 There is remarkable parity in the adoption 
of these two crimes, with only one of the 54 states incorporating sexual crimes not also doing so for 
child soldiers.81 In both instances, 33 of these states were members of the Like-Minded Group. The 
consistency here suggests first that newer norms are particularly susceptible to slow domestication, 
and second that their incorporation is strongly associated with the emergence, and subsequent 
acceptance, of the Rome Statute as a new articulation of appropriate behaviour. 
                                                     
76 People’s Republic of China, Statement Before the 6th Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. Similarly, see 
Scheffer, “Deterrence of War Crimes in the 21st Century.”  
77 Rome Statute, Articles 7(g) and (j), respectively. During the Rome negotiations “a vocal minority of anti-abortion groups, 
supported by the Vatican and Arab states” sought “to prevent any language that might be interpreted as facilitating 
abortion from entering the Statute.” Glasius, International Criminal Court, 32. “The main aim of the proposal was to 
replace the crime of forced pregnancy with ‘forcible impregnation.’ Despite the similarities between these terms, the two 
crimes contained different elements or rules defining the parameters and penalties for the crime. For instance, whereas 
forcible impregnation referred to the single act forcing women into pregnancy, forced pregnancy was a ‘broader concept 
involving keeping women pregnant,’ even in the case of rape or incest.” Roach, Politicizing The International Criminal 
Court, 144. For full list of states, see Bedont and Hall Martinez, “Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes,” 75, n. 44; and 
Glasius, International Criminal Court, 88-89.  
78 In particular: Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Japan and Sweden. 
79 A further 13 states have domestic legislation that partially incorporates the Rome Statute standard, but these provisions are 
typically drawn from Article 27(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 which includes only some of the sexual 
offences listed in Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(xxii). 
80 Rome Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi). Interestingly, six of these states are not currently parties to the Rome Statute. 
81 Bosnia and Herzegovina. 32 of these states were also members of the Liked-Minded Group. 
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This pattern is reflected in other aspects of the war crimes definition as well. Article 8 brings 
violations of the laws and customs of war in both international and non-international conflicts under 
one operative legal article. Here again we should anticipate relatively low incorporation, since a 
number of states have previously resisted legal innovations relating to non-international armed 
conflict.82 The dataset confirms this expectation. While 99 states—including 14 non-parties and six 
signatories—have fully incorporated the provisions of Article 8(2)(a) concerning grave breaches of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, only 56 have similarly done so for Article 8(2)(e), which addresses 
“serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international 
character.” Many of these crimes were previously codified (in whole or in part) in the more 
controversial Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.83 It is particularly notable that of this 
group of states, fully 52 are current State Parties to the Rome Statute, and 39 were part of the Like-
Minded Group. 50 have also incorporated the provisions concerning sexual crimes and child soldiers 
in international armed conflicts, suggesting that the incorporation of these contested international 
standards is closely connected.84 Finally, eight states—Burundi, Central African Republic, Colombia, 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Philippines and Uganda—incorporated the 
standards of Article 8(2)(e) during internal armed conflicts in which these crimes may have featured, 
again highlighting the significant costs associated with this kind of legal change. 
These findings draw attention to two important theoretical points. First, many states are 
compliant with Article 8(2)(a) as a result of their prior internalization of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and antecedent laws of war stretching back into the nineteenth century; this is especially true of non-
party states. This provides further evidence of the legacy effects discussed above, and suggests one 
way in which the Rome Statute may gain legitimacy among non-members by virtue of its association 
with a long legal tradition that includes states like China, India, Russia and the United States. At the 
same time, however, the fact that so few non-parties have incorporated other features of the ICC war 
crimes regime limits the extent of this commonality. Second, incorporation of the more innovative or 
contested aspects of the Rome Statute is strongly correlated with ICC membership. In these cases, 
states have employed the legal criteria of the Statute in modifying their own domestic practice. The 
Statute has thus become a prominent instrument for consolidating international expectations 
concerning the scope of grave international crimes. As noted already, however, this process remains 
substantially incomplete. 
 
Cooperation 
The challenges of domestic legal incapacity are further illustrated with reference to expectations 
concerning national cooperation with Court activities. State Parties have regularly acknowledged the 
vital importance of meeting their commitments to cooperate with and facilitate ICC operations.85 
                                                     
82 Regarding this controversy during the Rome negotiations, see Kirsch and Holmes, “The Rome Conference,” 7. 
83 The latter agreement is less widely ratified than the original 1949 Conventions. As of June 2012, there were 194 State 
Parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and 166 to Additional Protocol II. However, prominent states including Israel, 
Iran, Turkey and the United States have not joined APII. International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2010, 
572-578. See also La Haye, War Crimes, 173-174. 
84 By way of comparison, 72 states—including six non-parties and three signatory states—have incorporated the language of 
Article 8(2)(c), which concerns “serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions” in instances of 
non-international armed conflict. However, the protections enumerated in sub-article (c) are derived from the widely 
accepted 1949 Geneva Conventions, and not the more deeply contested standards of Additional Protocol II. Hence the 
finding that considerably more states (and especially non-members of the ICC) have endorsed sub-article (c) without also 
incorporating those found in sub-clause (e) only serves to reinforce the point that the 1949 Conventions remain a more 
acceptable international standard and that the Rome Statute is an important vector for increasing state incorporation of 
war crimes law in non-international armed conflicts. 
85 Assembly of States Parties, Kampala Declaration, operative paragraph 7; Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Bureau 
on Cooperation; Rastan, “Responsibility to Enforce.” 
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Moreover, these responsibilities, articulated in Part IX of the Rome Statute, are generally understood 
to impose specific legal obligations on treaty members.86 Yet thus far, the calls for greater cooperation 
have not been met. State Parties have an average compliance rate of only 35%, implementing 2.09 of 
the 6 cooperation indicators. Interestingly, the 68 members of the Like-Minded Group fare only 
slightly better, with an average score of 2.76, though 30 of these states have scores of 4 or higher. The 
extension of these norms to non-members is virtually non-existent: current signatories average a 1% 
rate of incorporation (0.06 out of 6), while non-parties are even lower (0.01 out of 6). This makes 
sense, since cooperation in most instances applies only to ICC member states, and these particular 
commitments are not found in prior legal agreements. The formal codification of obligations via 
legislative change is thus a process normally only contemplated by treaty members. Moreover, 40 
states—all of whom are ICC members—have scores of 4 or above, further suggesting that the 
incorporation of cooperation provisions typically comes as a bundled legislative response to the legal 
demands of ratification. 
 
Figure 2: National Implementation of Cooperation Indicators87 
 
  
A disaggregated view (Figure 2) reinforces the general pattern of limited legislative change among 
State Parties, and especially non-members. Thus far, only 37 ICC parties have included a provision 
specifically acknowledging the obligation to cooperate with Court requests for assistance, as per 
Article 86 of the Rome Statute.88 Recognition of the special legal status of Court officials has received 
greater endorsement thus far, with 71 State Parties ratifying or acceding to the Agreement on the 
                                                     
86 Bekou, “Case for Review of Article 88;” and Swart, “General Problems.” A United Nations Security Council resolution 
referring a situation to the Court—as with Sudan and Libya—is the one exception in which non-parties incur a legal 
obligation to cooperate with ICC processes. See Ciampi, “The Obligation to Cooperate,” 1609-1617. 
87 “Partial” incorporation of the “APIC” indicator refers to signature (but not ratification) of the Agreement on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the Court. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Ratification/Accession and Signature of the 
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Court.  
88 A further five State Parties have made general reference to this commitment without reflecting the Rome Statute language. 
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Privileges and Immunities of the Court (APIC), and a further 62 having signed the document.89 This 
greater degree of state compliance is likely owing to two principal factors. First, the APIC merely 
reflects established principles concerning the special status of diplomats and representatives of 
international organizations, and is thus largely uncontroversial. Second, the APIC can be domesticated 
via ratification or accession and without the long process of developing detailed national legislation to 
implement other Rome Statute obligations.  
On issues of particular concern to the proper functioning of the ICC as a legal and judicial 
institution, the data presented here is unimpressive. State progress in criminalizing the obstruction of 
Court activities—denoted as “AIDE” in Figure 2—has received limited uptake, with 33 State Parties 
including comprehensive language in their implementing legislation.90 The numbers are very similar 
with respect to the provision of documents for ICC investigations91: only 35 states have included this 
obligation in their implementing laws, with three others providing an incomplete rendering of the 
Rome Statute formulation. Hence little more than a quarter of all State Parties currently have the 
domestic legal authority to contribute to vital Court needs. 
Arguably the most pressing state contribution to ICC operations—the arrest of indicted 
individuals and their subsequent surrender to the Court—has also received only limited support in the 
national laws of State Parties. Forty-three states have included a specific reference to this obligation 
and provided procedures to facilitate the detention and transfer of suspects, while two others have 
partially addressed this issue in their national legislation. Various authors have noted that arrest and 
surrender remains a key gap in state commitment to the Court. For example,  
 
the failure to date of States Parties to ensure the execution of the majority of the arrest warrants 
issued by the Court has put the issue of international cooperation at the centre of deliberations. The 
judges are increasingly inquiring as to the fulfilment by States of their cooperation obligations, 
particularly in respect of the warrants of arrests issued by the Court. The President of the Court 
and the Prosecutor, moreover, have made repeated calls on States to shoulder their responsibilities 
under the Statute.92 
 
The dataset findings presented here suggest that the absence of domestic legal capacity is an important 
reason why states have yet to meet these commitments. Finally, ICC members have been slow in 
implementing provisions for the enforcement of Court convictions. Since the Court does not have a 
permanent detention facility of its own, its sentences will have to be undertaken in a national penal 
system.93 In this light, the fact that only eight State Parties have explicitly included procedures to 
facilitate the acceptance of ICC criminals in their national laws—with a further 30 making a 
generalized commitment without outlining specific mechanisms—may complicate future efforts to 
place convicts.  
With only two exceptions, the cooperation provisions discussed here have been incorporated 
via ICC-specific national implementing legislation. This observation reinforces the call from many 
quarters to make national implementing legislation a priority.94 In important respects, therefore, the 
Rome system currently features only a limited capacity among members to address vital aspects of the 
institution’s operations. The low rate of state incorporation on matters of cooperation is problematic 
both for the efficacy of the institution—by limiting the scope of actors that can positively contribute to 
                                                     
89 Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court, Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
International Criminal Court. These statistics are current as of January 2012. CICC, Ratification/Accession.  
90 Rome Statute, Article 70. One state has also partially incorporated this commitment in their legislation. 
91 Rome Statute, Article 93(d) and (i). 
92 Rastan, “Responsibility to Enforce,” 164; more generally, see Swart, “Arrest and Surrender.” 
93 Kress and Sluiter,“Imprisonment.” 
94 Assembly of States Parties, Cooperation. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Background Paper.  
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its judicial mandate—and the prospective consolidation of Rome Statute norms – since only 
widespread adaptation and engagement would reinforce an expectation that the supranational judicial 
model embodied in the Statute is the appropriate response to the demands of international criminal 
justice.  
 
Conclusion 
A central contention of this paper is that national legislation provides a window into the internalization 
of international norms that is not captured by reference to formal institutional membership or other 
forms of behavioural change and adherence. The development of a new dataset measuring national 
implementing legislation is thus an important empirical contribution to the growing literature on ICC 
effectiveness.  
Despite widespread membership, the Rome Statute has thus far been largely ineffective at 
changing state behaviour in this vital context, and domestic incorporation of the Rome Statute remains 
substantially incomplete. The evidence presented above reveals generally low levels of national 
legislative implementation, both in terms of the incorporation of core crimes and modes of liability, 
and cooperation with Court activities. This means that states across the international system currently 
have only a limited ability—as provided in their national laws—to enforce ICC crimes within their 
domestic jurisdictions. There is a strong linkage here to the broader concern with behavioural change, 
since the absence of sufficient national legislation contributes to this non-compliance, by denying the 
legal and judicial conditions necessary to facilitate state engagement. This in turn impedes the 
effective operation of the ICC regime, as gaps in domestic legal systems weaken the network of 
international justice and place further burdens on the Court to enforce for itself grave violations of 
international criminal law. These gaps can be deployed by ambivalent states in an attempt to excuse 
and avoid obligations under the Statute; in this respect, incapacity can suggest a lack of political will at 
the heart of state inaction.  
The present analysis also broadly confirms the general hypotheses of this study, though with 
significant caveats. First, the experience with State Parties is broadly in keeping with the expectation 
that treaties serve as focal points for clarifying new standards of appropriate behaviour—defined in 
terms of their legal criteria—for members of the formal treaty community. In some cases, as with the 
category of crimes against humanity and certain war crimes, the Statute provides the most 
comprehensive legal articulation of the rule, and thus sets the standard for new social expectations 
concerning the scope of the grave crimes regime. The treaty has therefore served as the reference point 
for the transmission of international rules and norms to domestic institutions. Since the advent of the 
ICC, therefore states that have developed new legislation to address relevant international crimes have 
overwhelmingly been parties to the Rome Statute. Moreover, members of the Like Minded Group are 
far and away the most likely to substantially incorporate the relevant indicators, which confirms the 
expectation that early endorsement of the Court is highly correlated with subsequent pro-norm change. 
There are important limits to this impact, however, as the extent of incorporation is relatively modest 
even among the most amenable states. The expansion of ICC membership has therefore led to only a 
limited diffusion of Rome Statute features into the national laws of treaty parties, and has had little 
influence on the domestic legal contexts of non-party states. 
Second, the empirical evidence also suggests some key limitations of legacy effects in 
providing the conditions for the spread of legal norms. The Rome Statute clearly benefitted from its 
association with existing international legal structures, as the constitutive process of reaffirming and 
refining these norms generated widespread support for the creation of the Court. Yet these connections 
have not led to a similarly broad incorporation of constituent criminal features in domestic legislation, 
as already noted. It would appear that many antecedent norms and rules of international humanitarian 
and human rights law were not widely incorporated in domestic law prior to the emergence of the 
Rome Statute. This fact can help explain the limited overlap with existing national laws in non-party 
states as well as some otherwise supportive ICC members. It has been suggested, for example, that the 
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lag in incorporation may be owing to the relative unfamiliarity of international rules and norms in 
many national legal systems.95 This provides an important qualification to the brief theoretical account 
presented above, while at the same time further reinforcing the significance of the Rome Statute—and 
its domestication—as a means of consolidating prior international law. 
 Despite these significant caveats, the incorporation of some Rome Statute crimes—
principally genocide, and to a lesser extent the grave breaches articulated in Article 8(2)(a)— even 
among non-parties, does provide a modest window of opportunity for expanding the reach of the ICC 
legal regime over time. The existence of these crimes in national law means that these states are 
capable of investigating and prosecuting cases on these grounds on their own territory, thereby 
alleviating the responsibility of the Court itself. At the same time, the promotion of international 
norms often occurs by analogy, as new social and legal standards are associated with prior principles 
and rules that hold wider sway. The fact that many non-parties already recognize some Rome Statute 
crimes in their national laws narrows, but by no means resolves, the divergent visions for how best to 
organize and pursue international justice. Hence, it is at least conceivable that the endorsement of the 
crime of genocide and some war crimes can be leveraged to bring such states into closer alignment 
with the commitments of the Rome Statute.  
Whether the Rome Statute will ultimately prove successful at reshaping international 
responses to atrocity crimes will go a long way to inform the legacy of the Court. While no definitive 
answers are possible at this early stage in the Court’s development, this paper has offered some initial 
assessment, and theoretical and empirical grounds for studying the further adoption (or stasis) of ICC 
norms. 
  
                                                     
95 Regarding the Japanese experience, see Meierhenrich and Ko, “How Do States Join the ICC,” 254. 
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Appendix: Coding Rules and Sources 
This dataset addresses national implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. The goal is to determine whether, and to what extent, State Parties as well as non-party states 
are adopting the principal features of the ICC, and what patterns may be developing within this 
process. Since the Statute anticipates legal parity at the national level, tracking the existence of ICC 
crimes and procedures in domestic legislation provides a good proxy for the spread of ICC norms, and 
hence a partial account of institutional effectiveness.  
 
Temporal Representation 
The analysis of the ICC is not divided into specific temporal periods but rather captures the entire 
timeframe from the conclusion of the Rome Statute in 1998 through to December 2011. This decision 
was necessitated by two considerations. On the one hand, the ICC regime lacks an permanent, 
institutionalized monitoring mechanism of the kind that has proven so useful in other treaty regimes 
(the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty, for example). As such, it is extremely difficult to track changes 
in state compliance on an annual or semi-annual basis in the necessary detail and with sufficient 
coding reliability and consistency. On the other hand, the type of behavioural change captured by this 
dataset is less suited to fine-grained temporal distinctions. National legislation—the primary subject of 
study in this analysis—tends to change infrequently and in “bursts” that encompass a number of 
relevant features at one time. It is therefore sufficient to focus on the nature of national policy change. 
The lack of differentiation in terms of yearly state progress is thus offset by the extensive detail 
included in the constituent indicators. 
 
Data Sources and Scope 
This analysis is based on a comparison of the text of the Rome Statute with language of domestic laws 
– both specific implementing legislation and, where applicable, prior criminal codes. This study 
utilizes a series of external databases of national legislation. The National Implementing Legislation 
Database (NILD)—developed jointly by the University of Nottingham’s Human Rights Law Centre 
and the International Criminal Court Legal Tools Project96—was initially employed as the primary 
source. The database contains the most extensive repository of national legislation concerning the 
Rome Statute that can be searched either by individual state or by a collection of 800 keywords.  
To compile the data, I first undertook a series of keyword searches for each of the chosen 
indicators and for every available state within the NILD. I then conducted a further qualitative analysis 
of the available documents for each state identified by the searches, in order to verify parity between 
the Rome Statute and the relevant legislation. Since the NILD only covers approximately 60 states at 
present, I subsequently consulted three additional databases—maintained by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime —in order to assess the available national legislation 
for the 196 states in my dataset. An English version of the relevant legislation was sometimes not 
available; in these circumstances I utilized Google Translate in order to render the relevant passages 
for comparison. Since I am comparing only the existence of legal concepts—rather than verbatim 
incorporation of the Rome Statute text—this was an acceptable, though imperfect, approach. Finally, 
the above research was occasionally supplemented with reference to academic sources where external 
databases were inconclusive. When taken together, these sources provide the empirical data for coding 
state adoption of ICC norms. Coding for the ICC dataset was conducted during October and 
November 2011. 
Focusing on the incorporation of core procedural and substantive norms enshrined in the 
Rome Statute is potentially controversial, as the Statute wording and extant state practice make clear 
                                                     
96 www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/hrlc/international-criminal-justice-unit/implementation-database.php and http://www.legal-
tools.org/en/. 
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that implementing legislation is not legally obligatory. This assessment is further complicated by the 
fact that there is no agreed international standard delimiting the proper approach to the domestication 
of international crimes. There is thus great variety in the particular form domestic implementation will 
take, and this study does not privilege one approach—stand-alone legislation, amendment of existing 
laws, etc.—in assessing state adaptation. Nevertheless, there is widespread agreement that as a 
political matter, some form of legislative change is necessary so as to ensure that all relevant features 
of the Statute are addressed in national law as a prerequisite to facilitating state compliance. Moreover, 
domestic legal reform offers an important demonstration of state commitment to the ICC and its 
norms. Considered in these terms, therefore, domestic legal change is a vital, but by no means 
sufficient, demonstration of state compliance and adaptation.  
Limiting my attention to legislation specifically implementing the Rome Statute would 
obviously exclude those states that have not ratified or acceded to the treaty, as well as those who have 
yet to complete the national legislative process; in this respect, the dataset would capture only a 
relatively modest sub-set of state cases. In order to address the broader international status of 
constituent rules and norms, I replicate the coding protocols to include all states regardless of their 
status vis-à-vis the treaty. This is useful as it allows the researcher to suggests ways in which aspects 
of the Rome Statute are anticipated in states that officially oppose the Court or have yet to make 
significant progress in transposing the Statute domestically. 
 
Compliance Indicators 
The dataset seeks to operationalize the core ICC norms through a set of discrete indicators. Naturally 
these do not account for all features of the Rome Statute. Those selected do however closely accord 
with core treaty purposes, and have been identified for their legal and political significance – i.e., 
because they are vital to the proper functioning of the Court, or are regarded as particularly 
controversial or challenging to implement.97 In this way, I seek to assess the implementation of ICC 
norms under the most difficult conditions. 
The dataset identifies 12 main indicators: six concerning the principle of complementarity 
(territorial and national jurisdiction,98 the removal of immunity,99 command responsibility,100 and the 
core crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes101) and six reflecting cooperation 
concerns (general obligation to cooperate with Court operations,102 the special legal status of the 
Court,103 and more specific obligations concerning the punishment of the obstruction of justice,104 
arrest and surrender of ICC suspects,105 provision of documents and other evidence,106 and the 
enforcement of Court sentences107).These were further informed by an extensive set of more specific 
sub-indicators. 
Unless otherwise noted, coding reflects the degree of parity between domestic legislation and 
the legal (textual) content of the Rome Statute. Under this coding scheme, 1 represents the inclusion of 
                                                     
97 For one example, see ICCLR, International Criminal Court, 19-25. 
98 Rome Statute, Article 12.2. 
99 Rome Statute, Article 27. 
100 Rome Statute, Article 28(a). 
101 Rome Statute, Articles 6-8. 
102 Rome Statute, Article 86. 
103 Rome Statute, Article 48. 
104 Rome Statute, Article 70. 
105 Rome Statute, Articles 59 and 89. 
106 Rome Statute, Article 93(d) and (i). 
107 Rome Statute, Articles 103 and 109. 
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specific language incorporating the particular treaty feature (i.e., language that matches, or is 
substantively equal to, the provision found in the Rome Statute); by contrast, 0 indicates that no such 
provision exists in the national legislation. Less frequently, a cell may be coded with 0.5 to indicate a 
partial incorporation of Rome Statute language, for example by excluding certain elements of the ICC 
rule. Language that expands the scope of crimes beyond all recognizable definitions—for example, by 
eliminating the “widespread and systematic” criteria of crimes against humanity—is similarly coded 
as 0.5 to reflect the substantial disjuncture entailed. For some indicators—especially the three core 
ICC crimes—the relevant article in the Rome Statute contains multiple subsidiary clauses. In these 
instances, the main dataset reflects the aggregate implementation of the omnibus crime: 0 denotes 
incorporation of less than 50% of the distinct sub-clauses, while 0.5 is given for 50-75%, and 1 for 
greater than 75% incorporation. This measure is utilized in the main ICC compliance dataset, though a 
version of the more fine-grained dataset measuring each individual sub-clause is also available upon 
request. 
 
Jurisdiction (JURIS) 
This indicator measures whether the state in question has adopted the jurisdictional modality set out in 
the Rome Statute that applies to acts either committed on the territory of a State Party (even if 
committed by nationals from a non-party) or by the national of a State Party (in any territory).108 
Recognition in national law of the forms of ICC jurisdiction is necessary to ensure that the state in 
question can deal with any crimes under its purview. The main dataset indicator is composed of two 
sub-indicators that account respectively for the territorial and national modes of jurisdiction. This 
principal indicator is scored as 1 when both features are present in national law, and 0.5 when either 
one is present or (more rarely) when both are partially incorporated in domestic legislation. As 
elsewhere, a score of 0 indicates the absence of these features. Since the jurisdictional modalities of 
Article 12 apply to the core crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute, the features are only coded as 
present in national legislation if the state also recognizes the majority of ICC crimes in national law. 
This reflects the fact that to be of practical use, the modes of jurisdiction must apply to actual or 
potential acts. 
 
Elimination of Personal Immunities (IMMUN) 
This indicator captures the principle—central to the ICC regime and articulated in Article 27 of the 
Rome Statute—that all persons are subject to international criminal law. Building on prior 
developments including at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals and more recent ad-hoc criminal 
tribunals, the Rome Statute explicitly aims to overturn the prior customary international legal norm 
whereby (in most cases) senior political leaders are exempt from these kinds of criminal culpability, 
particularly when the proposed prosecutions are to take place via a foreign entity.109 In order to ensure 
full compliance and complementarity with the Rome Statute, State Parties must adopt the same 
                                                     
108 Rome Statute, Article 12.2. See also Bourgon, “Jurisdiction Ratione Loci.” This does not include more expansive 
assertions of authority over accused persons including “passive personality jurisdiction”, “jurisdiction of custodial State 
or State where present”, and “universal jurisdiction”. Due to the unsettled nature of the norm—and the fact that the Rome 
Statute does not impose a specific obligation for national jurisdictions—an age of criminal responsibility is not coded in 
this dataset. See Robinson, “Rome Statute and Its Impact on National Law,” 1863-1864 and Frulli, “Jurisdiction Ratione 
Personae,” 534. 
109 Article 27 of the Rome Statute states that the treaty “shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on 
official capacity.… Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether 
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.” As du 
Plessis notes, “[A]rticle 27(2) makes clear that the traditional doctrine of personal immunity for sitting state officials also 
does not apply. This latter provision is not found in the statutes of any of the earlier international criminal tribunals, and 
thus is unique to the ICC.” du Plessis, International Criminal Court, 77. On the complex interplay of Article 27 and prior 
norms of international law, see Akande, “International Law Immunities,” esp. at 407. 
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provision in their national law(s), in particular by eliminating existing immunities for Heads of State 
or Government, or other elected or appointed officials. As with jurisdiction above, the immunity 
provision was only coded as present in national legislation if the state also recognizes the majority of 
ICC crimes in national law. 
 
Command Responsibility (COMMAND) 
Article 28 reaffirms the principle of command responsibility in international criminal and 
humanitarian law: “A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall 
be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his 
or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control”.110 This dataset does not 
include the various grounds for excluding criminal responsibility, as to do so would introduce too 
much complexity into an already expansive dataset.111 Most notably, the rule (and associated 
conditions) concerning “superior orders”112 is not addressed here. This decision is justified by the 
reasonable assumption that the most politically controversial instances of criminal punishment are 
likely to involve senior military officers and civilian officials, and it is here that non-compliance is 
most likely to occur. The formal incorporation of command responsibility is therefore the most 
consequential for the perspective of assessing ICC influence. 
Beyond matters of the jurisdictional scope and subjects of legal authority, states should also 
fully incorporate the content of ICC crimes in their national law. While this is not an explicit legal 
obligation, the adoption of subject crimes is important for two reasons. First, failure to ensure national 
processes exist for investigating and prosecuting ICC crimes would leave states unable to fully meet 
the standards of complementarity set out in Article 17 and would result in gaps between national and 
international levels of criminal justice.113 Second, as discussed elsewhere, the crimes encapsulated in 
the Rome Statute are considered to be the most egregious in the international system.114 Therefore, it is 
important for the development of ICC norms that core crimes are treated as “special” crimes under 
domestic law, and distinguished from “regular” civil acts like murder, rape, kidnapping, and so forth. 
A separate dataset details each sub-indicator for the three core crimes individually. There are 
five such indicators for the crime of genocide, 11 for crimes against humanity, and fully 50 for war 
crimes. This approach is useful, as early experience has demonstrated that states may incorporate 
crimes in different ways (with broader or narrower definitions), or not at all.115 The coding for the sub-
crimes follows the standard protocol for this project and measures the similarity between domestic 
legislation and the language of the relevant Rome Statute crime: 0 reflects an absence of the particular 
provision, 0.5 denotes partial incorporation, and 1 indicates its full inclusion in domestic law. In cases 
where the domestic law is broader than the Rome Statute wording—for example, including additional 
war crimes not contained in the Statute116—the domestic provision is coded as 1, provided that it 
encompasses all features of the ICC standard. These are then composed into a single score reflecting 
overall national implementation of each genus of crimes: 0 denotes incorporation of less than 50% of 
the individual indicators, while 0.5 is given for 50-75%, and 1 for greater than 75% incorporation. It is 
this latter aggregate measure that is included in the main ICC compliance dataset. Because the Court 
will not gain jurisdiction until at least 2017, the crime of aggression is excluded from this analysis. 
                                                     
110 Rome Statute, Article 28(a). See also ICCLR, International Criminal Court, 72-73 and 86-89. 
111 Regarding the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility, see Rome Statute, Articles 31 and 33; and ICCLR, 
International Criminal Court, 89-91. 
112 Rome Statute, Article 33. See also Ambos, “Superior Responsibility.” 
113 Lee, “States’ Responses,” 4 and 44; Terracino, “National Implementation of ICC Crimes,” 422. 
114 Van den Wyngaert and Dugard, “Non-Applicability of Statute of Limitations,” 886; La Haye, War Crimes, 165-166. 
115 Terracino, “National Implementation of ICC Crimes,” 423 and 428-438. 
116 As with Argentina, Germany, and the Netherlands. Terracino, “National Implementation of ICC Crimes,” 424-5.  
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Genocide (GENO) 
This aggregate measure is composed of six sub-indicators—the chapeau clause laying out the 
operative features of “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group,” and the five constituent crimes—encompassing the crime of genocide as 
contained in Article 6 of the Rome Statute. Some states and commentators have argued that national 
jurisdictions may address the genocide crimes via existing “normal” statutory categories like murder, 
rape, and so on. However, this approach is problematic because it fails to capture the particular 
normative opprobrium attached to acts that by their nature are targeted against specific identifiable 
groups. It is this mental element of intent that is the key to the specific nature of genocide as a core 
crime, and what distinguishes acts as especially heinous. In order to be fully compliant states must 
incorporate the specific conception of genocide as defined in the Rome Statute; reliance on existing 
domestic crimes is insufficient.117  
 
Crimes Against Humanity (HUMAN) 
“HUMAN” is an aggregate indicator composed of 12 sub-indicators constituting the various elements 
of crimes against humanity, as well as the conditioning criteria that the acts were  “committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack,” as contained in Article 7 of the Rome Statute.118 These latter features are what transform 
“ordinary” crimes into more particular crimes against humanity. As above, a separate dataset details 
each sub-indicator, and the main indicator is a composite of these. While the Rome Statute reflects 
existing statutory and customary international law it also includes new categories, particularly with 
respect to sexual crimes.119 Indeed, as Lee notes, the absence of a prior treaty codifying crimes against 
humanity means that “Article 7 may… be regarded as creating an autonomous regime.”120 In this 
respect, state compliance—via domestic incorporation—is a good indicator of the normative status of 
these crimes and, by extension, the influence the Rome Statute is having on the progressive extension 
of international humanitarian and criminal law. 
 
War Crimes (WAR) 
“WAR” is an aggregate measure composed of 50 sub-indicators encompassing all elements as 
contained in Article 8 of the Rome Statute. In particular, war crimes are defined as those acts (a) 
occurring during a recognised armed conflict and that (b) constituted significant violations of the 
established laws governing warfare.121 The Statute by and large does not create new crimes but instead 
brings existing laws of war into a single, more comprehensive and precise, document. The 
incorporation of war crimes as detailed in the Rome Statute thus provides a useful means of assessing 
the influence of the ICC in consolidating these expectations. 
                                                     
117 Lee, “States’ Responses,” 25. Cassese notes that the Rome Statute incorporates word-for-word the language in Article II 
of the Genocide Convention, but is less expansive than Article II of the Convention (for example, by not including 
conspiracy to commit genocide as a crime). Cassese, “Crimes Against Humanity,” 347. 
118 Rome Statute Article 7.1. Lee, “States’ Responses,” 26-27; Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes, 253-260. 
119 See Byron, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 224-225 and 258-260; Cassese, “Crimes Against Humanity,” 373-
377; Glasius, International Criminal Court, 77-90; and Bedont and Hall Martinez, “Ending Impunity for Gender 
Crimes.” 
120 Lee, “States’ Responses,” 26. 
121 Rome Statute Articles 8.2(a-c) and (e). Regarding the nexus with an armed conflict, see Byron, War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity, 14-16. Concerning gravity, see Bothe, “War Crimes,” 380. For a detailed assessment of each 
constituent crime and its relationship to existing statutory and customary international law, see Byron, War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity, 21-187. Note, however, that unlike for genocide and crimes against humanity, this dataset 
does not include the four chapeau paragraphs for Articles 8(a)-(c) and (e). 
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Obligation to Cooperate (COOP) 
This is a generic measure of whether a state has incorporated a legal recognition of the obligation to 
cooperate with Court requests, though this does not require that the state adopt legislation or follow a 
standardized procedure.122 This is a useful indicator nonetheless, since it indicates political support for 
the cooperation norm, and removes potential barriers that may be present in the absence of clear legal 
mechanisms.123 Unlike core crimes or modes of liability that frequently pre-date the Rome Statute, 
provisions relating to cooperation are specifically directed towards treaty members, and so almost 
entirely exclude non-party states.  
 
Status of Court Officials (APIC) 
Article 48 of the Rome Statute requires that all states provide adequate recognition, in their domestic 
law, of the special status of the Court and its officials on their national territory.124 While this can often 
be accomplished via amendments to existing laws, a more complete protocol has been developed in 
the form of a stand-alone Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal 
Court (APIC).125 State recognition of the special rights and duties of ICC officials is operationalized in 
this dataset via formal acceptance of the APIC: 1 denotes ratification, 0.5 for signature, and 0 for no 
action taken. Data is derived from the most recent CICC tally (current as of May 5, 2011).126 States 
that have not ratified the APIC but have included parallel language in their national implementing 
legislation are coded as compliant in the same manner as other indicators derived from the NILD. 
These instances are noted in the dataset. 
 
Facilitating Court Operations (AIDE) 
This indicator measures state progress in criminalizing the obstruction of Court activities by 
individuals or groups with respect to investigations, collection of evidence (including access to 
witnesses), and the like.127 Failing to adopt and apply fully compliant procedural rules represents a 
likely way that State Parties may seek to avoid the full range of their obligations under the Rome 
Statute. 
 
Arrest and Surrender (ARREST) 
Articles 59 and 89 require that States Parties (and third party states subject to ICC jurisdiction) comply 
with requests from the Court for the arrest and surrender of suspects.128 To be fully compliant, states 
must include explicit provisions for facilitating such requests in their implementing legislation; the 
precise manner of these procedures is left to the discretion of the state.129 The obligation to turn over 
nationals to an international body is a particularly hard case for normative change since this provision 
                                                     
122 Rome Statute, Article 88. See Ciampi, “Other Forms of Cooperation” and “The Obligation to Cooperate.” 
123 Indeed, as Bekou has pointed out, “a state cannot use the absence of national procedures as an excuse for non-
cooperation…. As it is unlikely that a state would have legislation in place that would be completely in line with the 
Statute requirements, Article 88 serves as a gateway to all those provisions that need to be incorporated.” Bekou, “Case 
for Review of Article 88,” 470.  
124 Herve Ascensio, “Privileges and Immunities,” 289-295. 
125 Assembly of States Parties, Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities. 
126 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Ratification/Accession and Signature of the Agreement on the Privileges 
and Immunities. 
127 Rome Statute, Article 70.  
128 This duty has been described as “one of the cornerstones on which the Rome Statute rests.” Swart, “Arrest and 
Surrender,” 1640. 
129 ICCLR, International Criminal Court, 33-4 and 37-8. 
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is antithetical to the prior law in many states. At the same time, in most states existing procedures for 
inter-state extradition are too cumbersome to deal adequately with the ICC surrender process, and 
streamlined procedures need to be enacted to specifically address ICC requests.130 Importantly, 
therefore, the Statute explicitly regards surrender as distinct from the established practice of 
extradition (which governs the transfer of individuals between states), and provides no grounds for 
refusing an ICC surrender request.131 In the interest of maintaining a more efficient dataset, the 
obligation relating to provisional arrest found in Article 92 is not included in this indicator. 
 
Provision of Documents (DOCS) 
Articles 93(d) and (i) enumerate state responsibilities with respect to the provision of records and 
documents related to prospective and on-going Court investigations. For reasons of efficiency and 
parsimony, a variety of other important aspects of state cooperation—including the protection of 
victims and witnesses and the identification, tracing, freezing of assets from crimes132—are not 
included here. 
 
Enforcement of Sentences (ENFORCE) 
This indicator assesses the legal capacity of a state, via formal procedures, to accept individuals 
convicted at an ICC trial and incarcerate these persons in their own national prison system. These 
processes are outlined in Articles 103 and 109 of the Rome Statute. As the Court does not possess its 
own permanent detention facility, the responsibility for enforcing sentences falls on states. Yet as 
Article 103 makes clear, this is a voluntary commitment,133 albeit one that speaks to the willingness to 
expend material resources in support of the Court. States may indicate their intention to receive 
prisoners through their domestic implementing legislation and/or the conclusion of an Enforcement of 
Sentences Agreement with the Court.134   
 
Composite Score (COMPSCORE) 
This aggregate measure reflects the combined score of the preceding 12 indicators. This provides a 
“snapshot” of state compliance with core treaty features across the entire state system, judged on a 
standardized set of measures. 
 
A table summarizing the indicators and coding sources is available from the author upon request. 
                                                     
130 Lee, “States’ Responses,” 2. 
131 Rome Statute, Article 102(a) and (b). On the latter point, see ICCLR, International Criminal Court, 37-38; and Robinson, 
“Rome Statute and Its Impact on National Law,” 1852-1855. 
132 Rome Statute, Article 93.1(j) and (k), respectively. 
133 Kress and Sluiter,“Imprisonment,” 1787. 
134 In order to maintain consistency in the application of justice, State Parties should adopt implementing legislation which 
broadly follows the Rome Statute sentencing guidelines (Article 77). However, the Statute does not impose a specific set 
of legally binding punishments for particular crimes, and so this dataset does not attempt to measure individual state 
policies concerning appropriate penal sanction.  

  
 
